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THE LESSON OF THE OWL AND THE CROWS: THE
ROLE OF DECEPTION IN THE EVOLUTION OF THE
ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES
WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR.*
I. GAME THEORY AND THE ADVANTAGES OF THE GOOD FAKE
In recent times, a number of writers have devoted attention to the
application of game theory to legal phenomena.' Unlike much formal
decision analysis, the game theory "best" choice is strikingly condi-
tional and dependent upon the strategies of the other players. 2 The
point is made convincingly by the predicament of the red squirrel:3 the
squirrel developed chattering as a strategy to discourage predators like
the great horned owl; it was a good strategy for the moment because
an alert prey is of no interest to the owl. But chattering is not a good
strategy for all times and occasions; with the appearance of a new
predator-humans armed with rifles-chattering is a decidedly poor
strategy.
In this world of strategies and counterstrategies, the advantages of
the good fake are not to be overlooked. Fakery is an indelible part of
the landscape in settings where we readily accept the gaming meta-
phor-sporting events are the obvious examples. But I wish to empha-
size how fakery and deception can play an important role in legal
interactions as well, particularly in the writing of the environmental
statutes.
Environmental lawyers often are fond of borrowing examples from
natural history to illustrate propositions of law. There is more to this
* William H. Rodgers, Jr., Bloedel Professor of Law, University of Washington, Seattle,
Washington 98105, delivered as a lecture at Florida State University College of Law, Feb. 25,
1988. This essay benefited from a presentation at a workshop at the Yale Law School, Nov.
1986. A companion article will appear as Rodgers, The Lesson of the Red Squirrel: Consensus
and Betrayal in the Environmental Statutes, 5 J. CONTEMIP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y - (1988)
(Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law).
1. See, e.g., Rodgers, The Evolution of Cooperation in Natural Resources Law: The
Drifter/Habitu& Distinction, 38 U. FLA. L. REv. 195 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 Drifter/Habitu];
W.H. RoDGERs, ENVIRONmENTAL LAW: Am AND WATER, 2 vols. (1986) [hereinafter Am AND
WATER]; Elliot, Ackerman & Millian, Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federaliza-
tion of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 313 (1985).
2. 1986 Drifter/Habitu§, supra note 1, at 197.
3. Rodgers, The Lesson of the Red Squirrel: Consensus and Betrayal in the Environmental
Statutes, 5 J. CONTEN'. HEALTH L. & POL'Y - (1988) [hereinafter 1988 Red Squirrel].
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practice than habit, it seems to me, because the natural laws of evolu-
tion contain lessons in the results of competitive struggle that fit
closely the experiences of legal gameplaying.
Nature, it turns out, offers a treasure trove of fakes, feints, and
deceptions, described in the literature usually under the heading of
mimicry. 4 Individual members of species succeed not only by hiding,
but by misrepresentation if they are discovered by predators. One can
find examples of sheep in wolves' clothing: delicious insects that look
like poisonous ones and flies that succeed in droning on the same fre-
quency as stinging bees. Some wolves are dressed in sheeps' clothing:
one tropical hawk drifts about like a vulture and enjoys great hunting
success because the victims mistakenly believe they are in the presence
of a bird who prefers carrion. Nature offers this widespread resort to
deceptive props: some moths have evolved eyespot patterns on their
wings that are thought to startle predators, and thus offer the in-
tended victims momentary opportunities for escape.
And nature gives examples of deliberately deceptive behavior: the
title of my lecture is drawn from a tale5 of an owl and some crows
who were reared in close proximity to one another. In order to dis-
courage a steady and dangerous diet of silent swoops, any one of
which could be fatal, the crows developed a strategy of wandering
into easy range, "pretending" to be wholly unaware of the presence
of the owl, only to sidestep the futile strikes with disdain and ease. By
this stratagem, the crows "proved" to the satisfaction of the owl that
crows could not be seized, under even the best of circumstances, and
the unwanted attacks ceased altogether.
II. FAKING AND DECEPTION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES
In another paper, 6 I've developed the notion that the process of en-
actment of the environmental statutes is a gameplaying phenomenon
that is likely to yield legislation with both "consensus" and "be-
trayal" features. It is important to underscore the significance of de-
ception, both in building the "consensus" necessary for enactment,
and in accomplishing the "betrayal" often observed in the waning
hours of enactment.
4. E.g., Lewin, Do Animals Read Minds, Tell Lies?, 238 ScIENcE 1350 (1987); Letter of
M.E. Bitterman, Creative Deception, 239 SCIENcE 1360 (1988) (noting that the capacity to com-
municate includes the ability to deceive); P. EVANS, OURSELVES AND OTHER ANn&ALs 105-124
(1987).
5. B. HEiNRICH, ONE MAN'S OwL 140-150 (1987).
6. 1988 Red Squirrel, supra note 3.
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A. Fakery: The Material of Consensus
1. Process Entitlements, Hedges, and Bets
It is no secret that process can consume substance, 7 and the environ-
mental laws offer many examples .8 Process is an excellent hiding place
for lawmakers who wish to remain uncommitted to particular sub-
stantive outcomes. Students of the subject often are astounded by the
profound indirection that grips the field of environmental law. Only
occasionally does the law ask whether a particular course of conduct
is compatible with environmental values. The question is more likely
to be posed in process terms-expressed most prominently in the im-
pact statement requirements.
2. Ambiguity and Delegation
Delegation of authority is another famous preference-hider that
makes a regular appearance in the environmental statutes. To mention
but one prominent example, the term "unreasonable risk" appears
thirty-five times in the thirty-three pages of the Toxic Substances Con-
trol Act. 9 There is great comfort for legislators who wish to hide in
this thicket immune from the sharp scrutiny of predatory constituents.
3. Dissembling and Manipulation
Dissembling and manipulation are other devices found regularly in
environmental statutes that allow legislators to remain noncommittal.
"Dissembling should be taken to mean hoping to achieve A by voting
for B and manipulation should be taken to mean a packing of the
agenda to make dissembling possible." 10 The phenomenon is de-
scribed convincingly by Judge Abner Mikva who gives this account of
the "careful[] nurturing" of a "difficult coalition" that included mi-
ners, mine owners and environmentalists by Representative Morris
("Mo") Udall as he guided some strip mining legislation through the
Congress:
He [Udall] was the floor manager and a lot of us were sitting in the
cloakroom when one of the Members from West Virginia, a mining
7. See Hazard, The Effect of the Class Action Device upon the Substantive Law, 58
F.R.D. 307 (1973). "Substantive law is shaped and articulated by procedural possibilities." Id.
at 307.
8. See, e.g., 2 Am AND WATER, supra note 1, § 4.33(A), at 476-82 (toxic pollution regula-
tions).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982).
10. 1988 Red Squirrel, supra note 3, at __.
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state, got up and said, 'Now will the gentleman from Arizona assure
me that this bill protects state sovereignty and makes clear that the
states continue to have an active and important role in how the strip
mines are to be regulated.' Udall said, 'The gentleman from West
Virginia is absolutely correct. The bill protects states' rights and state
sovereignty and makes sure that the states continue to play an
important role.' A little later on in the debate one of the
environmentalist Congressmen got up and said, 'Now will the
gentleman from Arizona assure me that this once and for all sets
federal standards and makes it clear that there is a federal law that
decides what kind of strip mining will be allowed?' And Udall said,
'The gentleman is absolutely correct. The law once and for all will
put the federal authorities in control.' He then came into the
cloakroom for a drink of water and we laughed and said, 'Mo, they
both can't be right.' He said, 'The gentleman is absolutely correct.'
The bill passed. Is it any wonder that the bill is not as clear and
precise and specific as some of us might have wanted?"
4. Postponements
Postponements, or "more study" provisions, are another useful
prop for lawmakers who won't or can't decide. There are all kinds of
reasons for putting off a decision until tomorrow, both benign and
otherwise, so it is relatively easy for a lawmaker to justify a "more
study" vote on principled grounds.
5. Self-Nulifications
Self-nullifications are legislative stand-offs "where command and
countermand are stuffed into the same sorry package.' ' 2 A good ex-
ample is the whistleblower protection provisions that are found in
some of the environmental statutes. 3 These provisions offer workers
who give evidence of polluting behavior protection from employer re-
taliation, but the thirty-day statute of limitations14 withdraws a mean-
ingful remedy in all but the unusual case. Nobody wins under this
kind of legislation, of course, but nobody loses either, and that is why
self-nullification in legislation is not at all uncommon.
6. Teases or Aspirational Commands
Teases or aspirational commands are additional techniques that al-
low lawmakers to be simultaneously "for" and "against" identifiable
11. Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 627, 636-37 (1987).
12. 1988 Red Squirrel, supra note 3, at _ .
13. See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2622 (1982).
14. Id. § 2622(b)(1).
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outcomes. Like the delegation tactic, commitment to a vague goal
does not tie a lawmaker to any particular means of implementation. 5
This is a dream political world without unsavory options and irascible
victims. The hard choices must await initiatives by somebody else.
B. Fakery: The Material of Betrayal
1. Defections
Defection is a term I've used to describe various end-of-the-game
stratagems used to seize advantages at the expense of the unprepared
and ill-equipped. An example is the legislative decision that allowed
the Tellico Dam to go forward in the face of powerful environmental
and economic objections:
[Tihe pork-barrel proponents, in forty-two seconds, in an empty
House chamber, were able to slip a rider onto an appropriations bill,
repealing all protective laws as they applied to Tellico and ordering
the reservoir's completion. Despite a half-hearted veto threat by
President Carter and a last-minute constitutionally-based lawsuit
brought by the Cherokee Indians, the TVA [Tennessee Valley
Authority] was ultimately able to finish the dam, close the gates, and
flood the valley on November 28, 1979.16
2. Sleepers
Sleepers, by definition, are legislative provisions with practical con-
sequences far outstripping those anticipated by the formal legislative
vision. It goes without saying that gameplayers who create or detect
beneficial sleepers do not advertise the fact, since the strategy is to go
for sizeable gains without paying any price in return. Obviously, pur-
suit of the sleeper strategy means that a law will look a great deal
differently the day after enactment than it does the day before.
15. See Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air Act, 30
UCLA L. REv. 740 (1983).
16. Plater, In the Wake of the Snail Darter: An Environmental Law Paradigm and Its Con-
sequences, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 805, 813-14 (1986) (footnotes omitted). See id. at 813-14 n.32
(pointing out how the legislative "maneuver" violated the rules of the House of Representatives
and how the move was engineered "so that none of the few representatives present would under-
stand what was being done").
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III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAKERY OVER TIME: AN EVOLUTIONARY
VIEW OF STATUTORY INSTRUCTIONS
A. Instability of the Legislative Product
Can we say anything useful about the fate of these environmental
statutes that include a precarious mix of consensus and betrayal
traits? First, let us define a statute as an act of the legislature that
instructs persons and organizations to act in certain ways. The typical
statute contains many instructions or norms within the legislative
package, and these are subject to differing interpretations. This uni-
verse of plausible interpretations is taken to represent the population
for purposes of analysis. Students of evolution emphasize that close
attention must be paid to the sources of change within the population
under study and to the selection mechanisms that yield differential
survival rates.1
7
What are the mechanisms that can introduce change or variation
into the set of instructions set loose as a statute? Preliminarily, it is
intuitively plausible that future gameplayers will take a strongly in-
strumental view of statutory instructions. These instructions will be
treated as part of the background environment available for self-
maintenance against the mischief of the world. The statute suddenly
means what lawyers and others say it means, as it undergoes transla-
tion in the world at large. Put somewhat differently, statutory instruc-
tions immediately will be put to use as interpretations in legal
gameplaying in a host of different arenas.
After enactment, self-imposed constraints on the players are sud-
denly loosened. Players are free to urge interpretations heretofore un-
disclosed, or indeed unimagined. Sleepers, skewers," and defections
are now in the open claiming unsuspecting victims. This frenzy of in-
17. E.g., N. ELDRIDGE, TIME FRAMES: THE RETHINKING OF DARWINIAN EVOLUTION AND THE
THEORY OF PUNCTUATED EQUmIBRIA (1985); E. MAYR, THE GROWTH OF BIOLOGICAL THOUGHT:
DIVERSITY, EVOLUTION, AND INHERITANCE (1982). See also J.T. BONNER, THE EVOLUTION OF
CULTURE IN ANDA IS (1980); D.R. HOFSTADTER, METAMAGICAL THEMAS: QUESTING FOR THE Es-
SENCE OF MIND AND PATTERN 119 (1985) (conflicting interpretations of a statute from which
some selection must be made?); H. KAUFMAN, TIME, CHANCE, AND ORGANIZATIONS: NATURAL
SELECTION IN A PERILOUS ENVIRONMENT (1985); Chibnik, The Evolution of Cultural Rules, 37 J.
ANTHROPOLOGICAL REs. 256 (1981); Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in
Statutory Evolution and Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 90 (1977); Diener, Quantum Adjustment, Macro-
evolution, and the Social Field: Some Comments on Evolution and Culture, 21 CURRENT AN-
THROPOLOGY 423 (1980).
18. Skewers shift liabilities to nonparticipants. One example in environmental laws would
be the shifting of liabilities to the taxpayer, such as indemnification for owners of banned pesti-
cides. 1988 Red Squirrel, supra note 3, at __.
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terpretation in the wake of enactment produces a long list of surpris-
ing readings and tactics. These include betrayals of sidebar agreements
not recorded in the legislation, the invention of legislative history af-
ter-the-fact, and the attribution of meanings scorned by the negotiat-
ing principals. 9 Legislative insiders routinely are offended by the
extraordinary directions "their" legislation takes at the hands of out-
siders, amateurs and skewees.
This strong centrifugal tendency toward different interpretations is
reinforced by catalysts and accelerators that are part of the initial con-
sensus product. The opportunistic decision-avoidance techniques nec-
essary to secure a nonzero sum law20 feed these later changes; the
postponements, such as the study or commission provisions, yield an
empirical harvest that can be used to modify tentative legislative con-
clusions. Delegations are famous for returning to haunt those who
took the easy way out. Other process deferrals rebound in similar
fashion as experience proves ihem unworkable in fact. 21 Variances and
exemptions necessary for enactment look like ugly "gaps" from the
fuller vantage point offered by time. Teases and half-laws are built-in
invitations to complete the story.22 The victims of eleventh-hour defec-
tions are spoiling to settle the score, and may have good reason to
believe they were done in by a bogus or unrepresentative law. 23
B. Courts as Selection Mechanisms
In this blizzard of different meanings, it is hardly surprising that
some interpretations stick and some don't. The institutions that do the
selecting are no mystery, 24 and the criteria for selection are the subject
of unceasing argument. Our attention will be confined to the courts
that have the prerogative to select and anoint as authoritative only the
chosen interpretations.
Courts change statutes because they reject some interpretations as
implausible and unjustified. Judicial readings can work in tandem
19. An illustration appears in Lombardo v. Handler, 397 F. Supp. 792 (D.D.C. 1975),
aff'd, 546 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 932 (1977).
20. 1 AIR D WATER, supra note 1, at vii.
21. The toxic pollutant provisions of the Clean Water Act are illustrative. Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982). See also 2 Am AND
WATER, supra note 1, § 4.33, at 475-90; C.S. Smodrr, A SEARCH FOR STRUCTURE: SELECTED Es-
SAYS ON SCIENCE, ART, AND HISTORY 62, fig. 3.13 (1981) (refinement, partitioning, and elabora-
tion of statutory instructions over time?).
22. The "protect and enhance" language in the statement of purposes of the Clean Air Act,
42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (1982), has grown into a huge no-significant-deterioration program. 1
AIR AND WATER, supra note 1, §§ 3.21-.23, at 351-82.
23. See supra text accompanying note 16.
24. These, of course, are legislatures, courts, agencies and private organizations.
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with other influences to encourage legislative amendments. The envi-
ronmental statutes are amended regularly, often with an expressed de-
sign to embrace25 or overrule 26 provocative judicial decisions. A few of
the ways in which courts can accelerate this process of legislative re-
consideration include the following:
* construing vague and ambiguous terms that were used as refuges
for choice avoidance;2 7
* disregarding contrived legislative history;28
* recognizing and enforcing "sleepers" that may change costs and
benefits as calculated by the legislature;2 9
* disregarding the cross-cancellation purposes hidden in statutory
"teases," which is another way of creating a constituency aggrieved
by the turn of events.3 0
It goes without saying that identification of the "correct" posture
of the courts in reviewing statutory hybrids, those that are partly con-
sensus and partly betrayal, is no easy task." Game theory counsels
that undeviating strategies are doomed to failure. This was the prob-
lem of the red squirrel, and it was the problem that was overcome by
the crows. One possibility is that the "best" strategy for the courts is
neither deference, nor a lack thereof to the legislative product, but
rather a combination of the two that can resist exploitation by the
legislative branch.
IV. EVOLUTION AND DIRECTION: RIsE, FALL, OR DRIFT?
History is littered with the reputations of scholars who have strug-
gled to discover normative advice in evolutionary behavior.3 2 But the
25. See 1 AIR AND WATER, supra note 1, at v-ix.
26. See W.H. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: PESTICIDES AND ToxIc SUBSTANCES 514 n.38
(1988). The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987, explic-
itly disapprove several court decisions.
27. A commendable practice that is disapproved in Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the
Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 549 (1985).
28. Compare United States v. Ilco, Inc., No. CV85-H-823-S (N.D. Ala. July 14, 1987)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (disregarding affidavits of two members of Congress stating
what was on their minds at the time of enactment in 1980) with Mikva, supra note 11 (discussing
the tendencies of legislators to develop contrived legislative history).
29. 2 AnR AND WATER, supra note 1, § 4.11, at 162-80.
30. See supra note 22.
31. 1988 Red Squirrel, supra note 3, at - (pointing out how the normal assumptions of
statutory interpretation disavow the deceptions that are manifest in the process and product).
32. E.g., J. HUXLEY, EVOLUTION IN ACTION (1953); P. KITCHER, VAULTING AmToN: So-
CIOBIOLOGY AND THE QUEST FOR HuMAN NATURE (1985); R. NISBET, HISTORY OF THE IDEA OF
PROGRESS (1980); G.G. SImPSoN, TE MEANING OF EVOLUTION (1967); R.J. RICHARDS, DARWIN
AND THE EMERGENCE OF EVOLUTIONARY THEORIES OF MIND AND BEHAVIOR (1987).
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question is unceasingly seductive: do statutes improve over time,33 de-
cline, or wander about pulled to-and-fro by the warring factions? This
question does not get much easier if an attempt is made to reformu-
late it in descriptive terms, such as: does the legal presence of statutes,
for example, their authoritativeness or influence, grow, decline, or re-
main static when measured over time?
A. Problems of Definition and Sampling
It is no easy trick to characterize the viability or authority of any set
of legislative instructions. One can envisage any number of indicators
that might serve as a rough measure of resolving power or authorita-
tiveness of a legislative directive.3 4 Measuring change over time of this
elusive "authoritativeness" is a more difficult challenge yet. Impossi-
bility theorems are likely to stand in the way of attempts to evaluate a
set of statutory instructions and to say something useful about their
future prospects.35 Even so simple a matter as statutory extinction,
marked by a repeal, may be indecisive if the observer chooses to pay
attention to the genetic heritage of the new legislative species.36
Even apart from the standard of statutory "authority," there is the
further complication of the short-run sample affording a misleading
indicator of trends.3 7 In all likelihood, empirical substantiation is
available for the more popular models: gradual decline,38 dormancy
and explosive growth, cyclical growth and decline, rapid growth and
gradual decline. This is not surprising since the phenomenon under
investigation, evolution of populations over time, is dramatically con-
ditional: extravagant success and abject failure alike are subject to
sudden reversal when the environment changes. The red squirrel hy-
33. A poll of all of those who select one interpretation over another is likely to disclose
unanimity for the proposition that the selected reading makes the statute "better" (e.g., more
welfare enhancing). What is the collective outcome of these countless individual "bests"?
34. Indicators might include the number of pages, citations in lawyers' documents, recogni-
tion in the relevant culture, and probability estimates of compliance.
35. See L.B. SLOBODKIN, GROWTH AND REGULATION OF ANsMAL POPULATIONS (2d ed. 1980).
"There does not exist any measurement or set of measurements of a population itself which will
serve as a measure of its probability of survival." Id. at 206.
36. To mention but one example, The Insecticide Act of 1910, ch. 191, §§ 1-14, 36 Stat.
331, was repealed in 1947, but its historic statutory instructions linger on in today's Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodentcide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1982). The search for common
ancestry is a delightful exercise long engaged in by paleoanthropologists, among others. It has
been aided by the spectacular advances in the techniques of molecular biology.
37. See, e.g., V. BRAITENBERG, VEHICLES: EXPERIMENTS IN SYNTHETIC PSYCHOLOGY 19, fig.
8 (1984) (short-run behavior of a statute?).
38. See, e.g., E.R. TUFTE, THE VISUAL DISPLAY OF QUANTTATIVE INFORMATION 41 (1983)
(gradual decline of a statute over time?).
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pothesis advises that every successful strategy is uniquely dependent
upon what the other players are doing.3 9
B. The Prospects of Devolution
Finessing these several difficulties, do we nonetheless have reasons
for believing that the prominent fate of a statute is decline? After all,
information theory is intimately linked to the entropy laws,40 and legal
researchers are constantly stumbling across the bones of desuetudenal
laws. Unfortunately, any general thesis of decline also must account
for spectacular episodes of growth. Historians of environmental law
could substantiate the claim that dramatic "advances" in the field
have been occasioned by the opportunistic application of old and out-
dated laws. 41
Three lines of argument hold promise for substantiating a thesis of
general decline. First is the intuitively appealing notion that any legis-
lative "snapshot in time," however cleverly contrived, will be isolated
and gradually overwhelmed by changes of fact and value. Working
against this vision of statutory entropy are various rehabilitation me-
chanisms to keep the laws current or responsive. Judicial interpreta-
tion is an obvious possibility, 42 although one suspects there is a
penalty associated with the best judicial revisions of old statutes.43 De-
spite this sense of a "Second Law" 4 at work, for example, that sta-
tutes will run down faster than they can be fixed, one really can't be
sure. The legislation perceived as a "snapshot in time" also evolves
with the times. Thus, the outcome of any contest between the tenden-
39. 1988 Red Squirrel, supra note 3. Robert Axelrod shows us that tit-for-tat is a robust
and successful strategy in a wide variety of environments. R. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF CO-
OPERATION, passim (1984). See also P. ANTHONY, GOLEM IN Trm GEARs 254-279 (1986). Tit-for-
tat is a failing strategy, however, in a world of defectors.
40. See J. CAMPBELL, GRAmmATIcAL MAN: INFORMATION, ENTROPY, LANGUAGE, AND LIFE
(1982). It was, I believe, Alfred North Whitehead who said: "Information keeps no better than
fish."
41. Nominees include issues of water pollution (Refuse Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1982)
and Bonneville Project Act of 1937, 16 U.S.C. § 832 (1982), that forbids power deliveries to
polluters), clearcutting, DDT, and the Alaska pipeline. User, as distinguished from preserver,
gains under outdated laws include the General Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. §§ 22-39 (1982),
and Massachusetts beach access (see Opinion of the Justices, 365 Mass. 681, 313 N.E.2d 561
(1974) (discussing Mass. HB 481 (1974)). These unforeseen applications of statutory "sleepers"
typically inspire "corrective" legislative responses.
42. See G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTEs (1982); see generally G.
GILMORE, TiE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977).
43. The penalty, perhaps, is measured by a decline in our unidentified standard of statutory
influence; call it a cost of political illegitimacy.
44. Reference is to the Second Law of Thermodynamics. See J. RIFKIN wITH T. HOWARD,
ENTROPY: A NEW WORLD VIEW 33-37, 56-58 (1980).
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cies of decline and the vehicles of rehabilitation appears indetermi-
nate.
A second way to think about statutes declining over time is to focus
upon the psychology of the players. Statutory paradigms in the minds
of lawyers may share a fate similar to scientific paradigms in the
minds of scientists.45 Old visions are squeezed out by the new, not
because of mass conversion, but because the old believers otherwise
die and pass from the scene. 6 Of course, this metaphor is imperfect:
new scientific theories catch on and spread presumably because they
represent an improvement in explanatory power and utility for the in-
vestigator. Are new laws an improvement on the old in this practice-
enhancing sense?47 One can think of a half-dozen reasons why "new
law" arguments are preferable to the "old, ' 48 but strong trends do
not necessarily exclude opportunities for the maverick. Game theory
brings us back to the lesson of the red squirrel and of the owl and the
crows: every strategy is a winner if the others are pursuing strategies
that make it a winner.4
9
A third way to assess the fate of statutes over time can draw upon
the insights of evolutionary biology about the dangers of specializa-
tion. Exquisite refinement within clumsy historical constraint is an ev-
olutionary path oft-taken,50 and it is a road to extinction: "[s]uch is
the way of nature that solutions so perfect they left no room for fur-
ther improvement often [come] to a premature end." 5 This course of
specialization is followed by many of the environmental statutes be-
cause of the dynamics of the gameplaying that produces the legislation
and changes to it.2 One can expect these jerrybuilt specialist laws to
be trapped in a destiny of decline, flanked and overwhelmed by cir-
45. See T. KussN, Ti STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962).
46. An informal tally of subscribers to the old Refuse Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1982),
as a tool of water pollution control discloses a diminishing pool of supporters, made up mostly
of aged sentimentalists and a small group of the legally illiterate, that is, nonlawyer investigators
who naively believe that the law means what it says.
47. Old laws, after all, have stood the test of time.
48. For example, they have a greater claim to legitimacy, a closer fit to contemporary prob-
lems and are more efficient.
49. The discussion in the text is suggestive of a famous article by John Maynard Smith, The
Theory of Games and the Evolution of Animal Conflicts, 47 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 209
(1974). One suspects that the choice of research models is better explained by game theoretic
thinking than by maximization analysis, where researchers gradually converge on the "best"
approach. In law, it seems, growth of popularity of one school simply opens the door to the
successful invasion by "maverick" hypotheses.
50. This lesson is taught elegantly in the several books of Stephen Jay Gould. See, e.g., S.
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cumstances changing about them. The decline of individual enact-
ments, of course, does not speak to the success or failure of the
overall enterprise. The legal war against pollution proceeds on many
fronts, and can claim gains elsewhere that outweigh individual set-
backs.
V. CONCLUSION
Deception is an integral component of communication and a promi-
nent feature of the decisionmaking processes that yield the formal
products of legislation. The effect of this deception on future legisla-
tive behavior and its treatment in the courts are deserving subjects of
inquiry. The principal judicial response to this phenomenon has been
denial, but there are reasons to believe that consistent perpetuation of
this fiction assures neither admirable legislation nor a quick fix of past
errors.
